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Abstract 
This article examines wage differences across Spain’s NUTS-2 regions along the entire wage distribution based on 
matched employer-employee microdata from 2006 to 2014. Unlike previous related studies, we properly control for 
differences in regional purchasing power parities, which are very large in practice. Although part of the raw regional wage 
differences observed are explained by differences between regions in productive structures and, to a much lesser extent, in 
labor forces, noteworthy, very similar throughout the wage distribution regional differences net of composition effects 
arise even after controlling for a broad set of individual and firm characteristics. 
Keywords: interregional wage differentials; decomposition methods; matched employer-employee data; wage setting 
institutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Geographical wage differences within a country are usually large and a relevant issue from a policy 
perspective. The literature has identified several factors that help to explain the magnitude and nature 
of these spatial wage differentials. According to Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008), these 
different factors can be grouped into three categories: composition effects, amenities and 
agglomeration economies. In particular, geographical wage differences could reflect spatial differences 
in the composition of the workforce and firms, non-wage amenities and/or the interactions between 
workers and firms that contribute to increase the productivity at the local level. The specific causes 
behind interregional wage differentials and their changes over the years are of great interest, as policy 
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implications depend upon the nature of these factors. Hence, as Pereira and Galego (2011) note, 
differences in interregional wages caused by non-human amenities such as the climate do not require 
policy interventions, whereas measures to improve competitiveness can alleviate interregional wage 
disparities caused by inefficiencies in the allocation of resources among regions. In the same line, 
policies devoted to enhancing worker and firm productivity in low-wage regions may be insufficient 
to close the gap if non-competitive factors, such as labor market institutions, also influence regional 
wages (Simón, Ramos & Sanromá, 2006). 
The examination of spatial wage differentials and the causes behind them has received quite 
some attention in the literature, covering a variety of countries, such us the UK (Blackaby & 
Manning, 1990, 1995), France (Combes et al., 2008), Germany (Kluge & Weber, 2018), the 
Netherlands (Groot & de Groot, 2011; Groot, de Groot & Smit, 2014), Spain (Motellón,López-Bazo 
& Attar, 2011), Italy (Matano & Naticchioni, 2012, 2016), and Portugal (Vieira, Couto & Tiago, 2006; 
Pereira & Galego, 2011, 2014; Galego & Pereira, 2014). Two different strands can be identified in this 
literature. The first strand, whose seminal study is Combes et al. (2008) and where subsequent related 
analyses can be found in Groot et al. (2014) or Matano and Naticchioni (2012, 2016), is composed of 
studies where spatial references in empirical analyses tend to be rather small (i.e. municipalities or 
local labor markets). The high number of spatial references considered in these studies allows the 
development of econometric analyses that examine the effect of different spatial characteristics (such 
as amenities or agglomeration economies) on previously estimated spatial fixed effects. The second 
strand of this literature consists of studies where the geographical references in the empirical analyses 
are much broader (usually corresponding to NUTS-2 regions), with a comparatively low labor 
mobility between regions. Their basic purpose is to identify interregional wage differences net of 
composition effects for observationally similar individuals through the use of econometric 
decomposition techniques, and the most outstanding references are the seminal studies by Blackaby 
and Manning (1990, 1995), and subsequent analyses by Motellón et al. (2011) and Pereira and Galego 
(2011, 2014).  












This article examines regional wage differences in Spain in the period 2006-2014 for NUTS-2 
regions, so it fits in the second strand of the literature previously mentioned. Given that in economic 
spatial research the scale of the regional classification chosen should correspond to the level of 
aggregation at which the researched phenomenon is expected to operate (Briant, Combes, & 
Lafourcade, 2010), we consider that the regional classification chosen to examine wage differentials in 
the specific case of Spain is particularly adequate to carry out our analysis for different reasons. First, 
because Spain is a highly decentralized country where many policies are in general designed and 
implemented at this regional level. Second, because at this regional scale certain labor institutions with 
influence on wage determination, such as collective bargaining, have a predominant role, and 
interregional mobility of workers in Spain is particularly low from an international perspective. 
Spain is a particularly interesting case for the analysis of interregional wage differences for a 
number of reasons. The first one regards to the specific characteristics of Spain’s labor market 
institutional framework related to wage determination, and the subsequent important regional 
disparities observed in the labor market in the country. In particular, collective bargaining in Spain 
differs to a great extent from other European countries where there exist also a predominance of 
sectoral agreements and a high coverage rate (between 80% and 90% of employees in the Spanish 
case), given that Spain is the only European country where sectoral collective agreements affect 
specific regions (NUTS-2 units) or provinces (NUTS-3 units) (Du Caju, Gautier, Momferatou & 
Ward-Warmedinger, 2008), and the bulk of workers in the country are actually covered by this type of 
collective agreements. This allows for very significant and time-persistent regional differences in 
bargained wage floors agreed in sub-national sectoral collective agreements, which lead to persistent 
regional wage differentials (Simón et al., 2006). In this vein, available evidence based on harmonized 
microdata strictly comparable across countries suggests that wage differentials between regions are 
comparatively high in Spain relative to other European countries where collective bargaining does not 
have a regional dimension (Simón & Russell, 2005), a finding which is consistent with previous 
international evidence that suggests that the specific characteristics of collective bargaining in a 
country influence significantly wage differentiation between regions (Vamvakidis, 2008). Moreover, it 












is important to note that a strong regional segmentation is observed in the Spanish labor market 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015; Bover & Velilla, 2005; Bentolila & Jimeno, 1998), where, for 
example, significant and persistent differences in regional employment and unemployment rates are 
observed (OECD, 2014a, Bentolila & Jimeno, 1998; Bande, Fernández & Montuenga, 2008). Some of 
the main causes behind that segmentation are actually the lack of adjustment in practice of regional 
wage differentials to regional economic conditions (International Monetary Fund, 2015), and the very 
low interregional migration flows, among the lowest of all advanced countries, and decreasing after 
the Great Recession (Bell, 2015; Eurostat, 2015; Liu, 2018).  
The second reason to analyze the Spanish case is that during the period examined (2006-2014) 
there were profound cyclical and regulatory changes, so it is a matter of particular interest to examine 
the extent to which regional wage differentials are persistent over time despite intense regulatory 
changes and cyclical fluctuations. In this vein, there were firstly profound regulatory changes in the 
labor market, most notably through the intense labor reform approved in 2012. As a consequence, 
greater flexibility in wage determination was introduced modifying inter alia many relevant aspects of 
collective bargaining (for more details see OECD, 2014b), with subsequent significant changes in the 
overall functioning of the Spanish labor market (Bank of Spain, 2016; European Commission, 2016). 
Although regional wages seem to respond still weakly to specific variations in regional economic 
conditions (International Monetary Fund, 2015), these intense regulatory changes might otherwise be 
plausibly associated with significant changes in the regional wage structures. On the other hand, in 
the period examined there were also intense cyclical fluctuations in the Spanish economy due to the 
effects of the double-dip recession associated with the Great Recession and the crisis in the Euro 
area, and the subsequent economic expansion (i.e. the unemployment rate before the Great Recession 
was 8 percent, reached a maximum of 26 percent during the crisis, and at the end of 2018 was around 
14 percent, with youth unemployment rates following a similar evolution but more than doubling 
these figures). 












The empirical analysis of regional wage differences in Spain is carried out using matched 
employer-employee microdata from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial, a database that provides rich 
information on employees and their jobs and firms. Moreover, it is based on econometric 
decomposition techniques which provide a detailed breakdown of wage differences between regions 
based on the individual contribution of each subset of explanatory factors, which allow to 
differentiate in practice between the influence of regional differences in labor forces and in the 
characteristics of firms in shaping regional wage differentials. The analysis is developed for both 
regional differences in average wages and for differences observed along the wage distribution. This 
contrasts with the bulk of the related literature, as only a few of the most recent studies focus on 
analysis throughout the distribution (as far as we know, they are limited to Motellón et al., 2011; 
Galego & Pereira, 2014; and Pereira & Galego, 2014). Examining what happens along the wage 
distribution could be especially relevant in the Spanish context, because wage moderation policies 
adopted during the recent economic crisis are known to have had a heterogeneous effect (with a 
greater impact on low-wage earners), which could result in changes in regional wage differentials in 
the lower part of the distribution. 
Other relevant aspect of our research is that it extends previous studies on the topic, given 
that regional differences in purchasing power parities are appropriately controlled for in the 
estimation of regional wage differentials. This is an issue that has not been properly considered in 
previous studies regarding this type of differentials in large regions, due to important error 
measurements in regional parities (Motellón et al., 2011) or to the use of regional inflation in rather 
short periods to approximate price levels (Galego & Pereira, 2014; Pereira & Galego, 2014). This 
question could be particularly important in the Spanish context given that persistent regional 
differences in consumer prices are facilitated by a wide dispersion of barriers to entry for firms in the 
retail sector across Spanish regions (Hoffmaister, 2010). Moreover, to restore external 
competitiveness and facilitate the adjustment of external imbalances, Spain adopted after the Great 
Recession an internal devaluation strategy to lower relative wages and prices (Bank of Spain, 2015; 
Rosnick & Weisbrot, 2015; Engler & Klein, 2017). As a consequence, asymmetries across regions 












could emerge as a result of a potential asymmetric pass-through of wage moderation policies into 
domestic prices in Spanish regions, given their significant differences in terms of productive 
specialisation and openness (Cuadrado-Roura & Maroto, 2016), as well as from different effects of 
the crisis and subsequent economic policies (Groot et al., 2011, Decressin et al., 2015; Agnello, Fazio 
& Sousa, 2016).  
The article is organized as follows. The next section summarises the literature on regional 
wage differentials. The third and fourth sections present the methodology and data used in the 
empirical analysis. The fifth section presents and discusses the empirical evidence, and, last, the final 
section provides the main conclusions and a discussion of the results. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to the seminal paper of Combes et al. (2008) and the subsequent literature (see, for 
instance, Groot et al., 2014), there are three main causes of interregional wage differentials: 
differences in productive characteristics, differences in nonhuman endowments, and agglomeration 
economies. Differences in productive characteristics are related to composition effects. Hence, 
interregional wage disparities can arise as individuals and firms are spatially sorted in a non-
homogeneous way. Labor force characteristics, such as education or experience, and firm and job 
requirements could notably vary across regions. Thus, wages in regions with highly educated workers 
and industries demanding a more favourable skill composition tend to be higher, as wages are linked 
to productivity. The second reason is related to interregional disparities in amenities, such as climate, 
institutions, technology, or transportation, as more favourably endowed areas are likely to embrace 
more productive firms and workers. The third reason for interregional wage differences are 
agglomeration externalities arising from labor market interactions, connections among firms, and/or 
knowledge spillovers. In dense areas a better matching between workers’ skills and firm requirements 
can take place, and physical proximity—together with demand and supply scale effects—allow for 
reduced input and output transaction costs (Duranton & Puga, 2004). As a consequence, interregional 












wage differences can also occur, as firms in more concentrated areas can take advantage of those 
productivity gains.  
Broadly speaking, the literature on spatial wage differentials can be divided into two main 
strands. The first strand of the literature comprises analysis focused in the analysis of wage 
differentials for small spatial units (namely, cities, metropolitan areas, local labor markets or 
municipalities), assuming spatial equilibria in a context of free mobility of labor and homogeneous 
workers where their utility is equalized across space, and therefore the observed wage gap is the result 
of differences in amenities and/or agglomeration economies (the seminal study in this vein is 
Combes et al., 2008, and other examples are Groot et al., 2014 and Matano & Natichionni, 2012, 
2016). The second strand, where our article fits, encompasses a second group of studies that examine 
geographical wage differences for larger regions (usually NUTS-2 units), characterized by low 
interregional mobility flows (e.g. Motellón et al., 2011; Galego & Pereira, 2014; and Pereira & Galego, 
2014).  
The use of microdata is a common characteristic of most of the studies on spatial wage 
differentials, as it is important to control for workers’ heterogeneity because sorting could determine 
an important part of regional wage inequalities. In order to deal with this issue, Combes et al (2008) 
apply a two-stage procedure where they first regress wages of workers as a function of observed 
characteristics of the individuals, industries and regions where they work adding also different types 
of fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated coefficients for area-year 
fixed effects are then used in a second-stage equation to assess the relative importance of 
endowments and between-industry interactions to explain spatial wage differences. While several 
posterior studies focused on the analysis of spatial wage differentials between small spatial units have 
followed a rather similar approach (i.e. Groot et al., 2014 and Matano & Natichionni, 2012, 2016), 
those studies focused in larger regions, where the number of geographical units is not large enough to 
apply the two-stage procedure proposed by Combes et al (2008), have applied a different 
methodological approach based on the use of econometric decomposition techniques. In particular, a 












number of studies have applied the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) proposal (OB) to assess the 
extent to which average regional wage differentials are due either to differences in regional 
endowments or to differences by region in the returns paid to these endowments. Some examples of 
studies within this group are Blackaby and Manning (1990, 1995), Vieira et al., (2006) and Pereira and 
Galego (2011). They conclude that, although different wages are finally paid to similar employees with 
similar jobs in different regions, it is differences in occupational, industrial, and education structures 
that play a major role on the explanation of regional wage disparities in countries like Britain or 
Portugal.i 
An aspect that has recently captured the attention of researchers is the analysis of spatial wage 
differences along the wage distribution and not only for average wages. For instance, in the above-
mentioned first strand of the literature, focused on the analysis of small spatial units, Matano and 
Natichioni (2012) examine the relation between spatial externalities (in terms of industrial 
specialization and density) and wages along the wage distribution for Italian (NUTS-3) provinces. 
They find that, even after controlling for spatial sorting and endogeneity, there is an increasing impact 
of spatial externalities along the wage distribution, so it is the skilled workers who benefit most from 
spatial externalities. In the same vein, Matano and Natichioni (2016), in a disaggregated analysis 
distinguishing between stayers and migrants, confirm for the Italian case that skilled workers have a 
greater advantage in wages as a result of working in areas of high employment density. Hakansson 
and Isacsson (2018) also examine for Sweden the spatial extent of agglomeration economies (through 
total employment in the area) across the wage distribution, on the basis that the spatial extent of 
agglomeration benefits could be larger for high‐ wage earners, spatially more mobile individuals. 
After controlling for observable and unobservable individual and establishment characteristics and 
endogeneity, they find that agglomeration economies do not shift the wage earnings distribution in a 
symmetric way, so the positive effects of increasing economic mass tend to be higher for the upper 
half of the wage earnings distribution (very especially in economically small locations). 












In the second strand of the literature, spatial wage differentials observed along the wage 
distribution for large regions have been in turn examined through decomposition techniques that 
extend the Oaxaca-Blinder approach to different points of the distribution. The number of studies is 
in general very scarce as, to the best of our knowledge, only Motellón et al. (2011), Pereira and 
Galego (2014), and Galego and Pereira (2014) have decomposed regional wage differences across the 
whole wage distribution. The former applies a non-parametric method suggested by Di Nardo, Fortin 
and Lemieux (2006) and Butcher and Di Nardo (2002), documenting increasing regional wage 
differentials along the wage distribution for the case of Spain. In turn, Pereira and Galego (2014) 
follow a semi-parametric method suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) and Melly (2005, 2006), 
providing evidence on significant interregional wage differentials in Portugal that increase 
monotonically for men and decrease at the top of the wage distribution in some areas for women. 
Although the results provided by Motellón et al. (2011) and by Pereira and Galego (2014) detail which 
part of the wage differential along the wage distribution is due to regional differences in endowments 
of observable characteristics and which part is due to regional differences in the returns paid to these 
endowments, none of them shed light on which specific variable(s) most matter in the explanation of 
interregional wage differentials. By contrast, Galego and Pereira (2014) apply the Fortin, Lemieux and 
Firpo (2011) proposal, which allows for gauging the contribution of each explanatory variable 
considered in the wage equation on both the endowment and the return components along the entire 
wage distribution. In line with the results provided by Pereira and Galego (2011) for interregional 
wage differentials at the mean in Portugal, Galego and Pereira (2014) conclude that differences in 
endowments in education, occupation, and firm size explain a relevant part of interregional wage 
differentials, although in a manner far from constant along the wage distribution. 
A final question to note is that studies focusing on wage differentials between large regions, 
such as our research, are typically based on cross-sections of matched employer-employee data and, 
as a result, unobserved individual heterogeneity cannot be properly controlled for due to the 
limitations of the data. Evidence on this question actually suggests that controlling for worker fixed-
effects is important and that, hence, sorting of workers is very relevant in explaining inter-area wage 












differentials (Combes et al., 2008) or in relation to the impact of agglomeration economies in wages 
from a spatial perspective (Matano & Natichioni, 2012). Yet, controlling in wage equations for 
occupations, as it is the case in our analysis, could partially correct for possible spatial selection biases 
as it may capture unobserved ability components (Duranton & Monastiriotis, 2002).ii 
Taking all this into account, our article extends the previous literature by analyzing spatial 
wage differentials in large regions after properly controlling for regional differences in purchasing 
power parities and applying decomposition techniques that properly allow to consider the role of 
individual, work and firms characteristics in explaining wage differentials observed both in average 
wages and along the wage distribution. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Our empirical approach to the analysis of interregional wage differentials in Spain consists of the 
decomposition of regional differences in wages to ascertain the extent to which they are explained by 
regional endowments of the characteristics of labor forces and firms or, alternatively, by the presence of 
adjusted regional differentials nets of composition effects. To decompose differences in averages and 
quantiles along the wage distribution we use the standard Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
methodology and the extension to this technique proposed by Fortin et al. (2011) based on the use of the 
recentered influence function (RIF) and the estimation of unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo, 
Fortin & Lemieux, 2009), respectively. It must be noted that unlike related techniques (i.e., Juhn, Murphy 
& Pierce, 1993; Machado & Mata, 2005), this methodology provides detailed evidence on the effect of 
individual explanatory variables on wage differentials that is not path-dependent (for details, see Fortin et 
al., 2011). 
3.1. Decomposition of regional differences in average wages: The Oaxaca-Blinder methodology 
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is formulated to decompose mean differences in wages between 
two groups (in our case the comparison is made between each region and the whole country) after 
the estimation of a semi-logarithmic wage equation, as  












 irririr Xw εβ +=  (1) 
wherein wir denotes the log of hourly wage of individual i in region r; Xir is a vector of controls 
including characteristics of individuals and their jobs and firms; βr is a vector of returns to observed 
characteristics in region r (including an intercept); and εir is a stochastic error term.  
To decompose mean differences in wages between region r and the national average, after 
having estimated a non-discriminatory reference wage structure with the pool of the two geographical 
references involved in the comparison,iii based on the properties of the ordinary least square 
estimator, the difference in average wages between the region and the whole country may be broken 















wherein rw  and Sw  are the average wages of the region r and Spain; rX  and SX  are the 
average observed characteristics of individuals and firms of region r and the whole country 
(comprising gender, age, education, nationality, tenure, type of contract, full- or part-time, supervisory 
tasks, occupation, sector, size, type of collective agreement, type of control, type of market, the 
proportion of women and immigrants in the firm, the proportion of workers with fixed-term and 
with part-time contracts, the proportion of workers employed in unskilled and skilled occupations in 
the firm, and the proportion of workers with primary and tertiary education in the firm); and rβ̂ , Sβ̂  
and *β̂  are the estimated coefficients following regression of wages on the set of explanatory 
variables for the region, the country, and the pool of both geographical references, respectively. The 
term averageX∆̂  is the composition effect, reflecting the part of the average raw wage differential between 
region r and the whole country arising from differences in endowments of characteristics, whereas the 












term averageS∆̂  is the wage structure effect, which corresponds to differences in the wage structure, and 
captures the regional differential net of composition effects.  
3.2. Decomposition of regional differences across the wage distribution: The Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo 
methodology 
The Fortin et al. (2011) methodology is an extension of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition that provides detailed decompositions of differences in any distributional statistic, such as 
the quantiles. The technique is based on the estimation of a regression in which the independent variable 
(the wage) is substituted by a transformation of the same, the recentered influence function (RIF). The 
influence function measures the effect on distributional statistics of small changes in the underlying 
distribution. Thus, for a given distributional statistic of the distribution FW, v(F), this function measures 
the importance of each observation in shaping the value of the statistic. Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 
(2011) suggest using a recentered version of the influence function adding the statistic of interest, 
RIF(W)=v(F)+IF(W), since its expected value is the actual statistic v(F) (insofar as the expectation of the 
function of influence with respect to distribution of W is, by definition, zero). 
In the case of the quantiles τq  of the unconditional marginal distribution WF , the 












+=  (3) 
where }{⋅l  is an indicator function and Wf  is the function of density of the marginal 
distribution of w evaluated in τq . The RIF may be computed empirically in the case of the quantiles 
by means of a local inversion following calculation of the dummy variable }{ τqwl <  (which specifies 
whether the value w is higher or lower than τq ), the estimation of the quantile of the sample τq , and 












the estimation by means of kernel density functions of the corresponding density function Wf  
evaluated in τq . 
Following the calculation of the RIF for the quantile, a value is provided for the transformed 
variable for each observation of the sample. Insofar as the effect of the change in distribution of an 
explanatory variable in the quantile may be expressed ceteris paribus, as the average partial effect of 
that variable in the conditional expectation on its RIF, and assuming that the conditioned expectation 
of the RIF may be modelled as a linear function of the explanatory variables, these values may be 
used for estimation by ordinary least squares of a regression of the RIF variable in a vector of 
explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients may be interpreted as the partial effect of an 
increase in the average value of an explanatory variable in the distribution quantile (Firpo et al., 2009), 
so that subsequently a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, as expressed in equation (2), can be 
developed for the quantiles of the wage distribution based on the regression results. 
However, that decomposition would yield consistent results only if the true conditional 
expectation of the RIF could be modelled as a linear function of the explanatory variables, implying 
that decomposition results based on linear regressions may be biased (Barsky, Bound, Charles & 
Lupton, 2002). For that reason, Fortin et al. (2011) recommend a two-step procedure to carry out the 
decomposition. The first step consists of following the Di Nardo et al. (1996) reweighting procedure 
to account for potential non-linearities in the true conditional expectation of the RIF.iv This 
reweighting procedure generates counterfactual observations that would result if individuals in the 
whole country had the same distribution of observable characteristics as individuals in region r, and it 
is based on the weights estimated via a probit model on the probability of being observed in region r.v 
Having estimated the RIF regressions for workers in region r, the whole country, and the 
counterfactual wage distribution on the reweighted sample, in a second step a Oaxaca-Blinder-type 
decomposition analysis can be performed on the reweighted data for any unconditional quantile (τ) of 
the wage distribution 































where superscript C stands for the reweighted sample estimates; rX  and SX  are the 
covariates means in region r and the whole country; τS∆̂  is the wage structure effect; and 
τ
X∆̂  is the 
composition effect. 


















where τ pS ,∆̂  is the pure wage structure effect, which provides the part of the wage differential 
explained by differences in the returns to observed characteristics at quantile τ and results from the 
difference between r,τ̂β and 
C
S,τ̂β  , and 
τ
eS ,∆̂  is the reweighting error, reflecting the fact that the 
reweighted sample average CSX may be different from rX . 




















where τ pX ,∆̂  is the pure composition effect, which provides the part of the wage differential 
explained by differences in the observed characteristics at quantile τ, and τ eX ,∆̂  is the specification 
error, which should be zero in cases where the model is linear.vi 
 
 












4. DATA AND VARIABLES  
4.1. The Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 
The data used in this research come from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Structure of Earnings Survey; 
hereafter EES), corresponding to 2006, 2010, and 2014. This survey is the equivalent of the sample 
for Spain of the European Structure of Earnings Survey, a survey conducted in all European Union 
members with harmonized information on wages. The EES is conducted every four years, providing 
independent cross-sectional data, currently available in five waves (1995, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014) 
and its information has increased over time in terms of variables and coverage, with the last waves 
covering firms of any size and most sectors of the economy (the only exceptions are agriculture and a 
very reduced number of branches of services). The three last waves have been considered in the 
empirical analysis, as they contain more complete information and cover almost fully the private 
sector of Spain’s economy.  
One of the main features of the EES is that it contains matched employer-employee 
microdata, as its design corresponds to a two-stage sampling of employees holding a job in 
workplaces registered in the social security system, and includes observations for various employees 
in each workplace. Consequently, the survey gathers very rich information regarding wage 
determinants related to both workers and their jobs and workplace characteristics. It is also 
noteworthy that the EES contains representative, disaggregated information at the regional level, 
serving as the reference the Spanish 17 autonomous communities/regions, equivalent to NUTS 2 
units. As a consequence, regional analysis can be carried out using information about the region in 
which the workplace is located.vii 
The two-stage stratified sampling method applied in the EES guarantees that the samples of 
employees surveyed are representative of the entire population of workers in each workplace. Thus, 
the first-stage units (workplaces registered in the social security system) are classified according to 
their economic activity, with each category stratified by region and size range (eight ranges). Stratum 












sample sizes are then obtained within this stratification with a maximum admissible error of 5 
percent, being the survey exhaustive for workplaces with more than 499 workers. Second-stage units 
(workers) are selected among those working during the entire reference month (October), and 
sampling depends on the size of the firm, being exhaustive for micro-firms (i.e., those with fewer 
than 10 workers), up to 25 employees at bigger firms (the average observations per firm in the sample 
is around 15).  
As indicated before, the independent variables considered in the empirical analysis gather rich 
information regarding both workers and their jobs and workplace characteristics. Worker 
characteristics variables include gender, nationality (natives vs. immigrants), education level (primary, 
secondary or higher education), and age (less than 30, 30-45, and more than 45 years old). Job 
characteristics variables include occupation (nine categories for major occupational groups), years of 
tenure in the current job and its square, type of contract (permanent or fixed-term), full- or part-time, 
and the eventual performance of supervisory tasks. Finally, firm characteristic variables include sector 
(12 categories), size (six strata), type of collective agreement (firm agreement, national sectoral 
agreement, or subnational sectoral agreement), and a full set of variables regarding the composition of 
the labor force in the workplace (measuring, respectively, the proportion of women and immigrants 
in the firm, the proportion of workers with fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs, the proportion of 
workers performing skilled and unskilled occupations, and the proportion of workers holding primary 
or tertiary education) as proxies of the quality of the labor force of the workplace and, hence, its 
productivity (Card & De la Rica, 2006). 
In conducting the empirical analysis, certain individuals are excluded, namely, those under the 
age of 16 or over the age of 65, those with hourly wages of more than 200 euros and those living in 
the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. In the same vein, in order to use a homogeneous sectoral 
coverage for all the waves of the survey, observations corresponding to section O of NACE-2009 
(Public administration and defence, compulsory social security) have been removed from the 2010 
and 2014 waves so that the analysis corresponds to the private sector. The final samples are formed 












by 139,989 employees in 2006, 164,266 in 2010, and 149,009 in 2014. Regional samples are ample, 
given that they range between 2,495 and 21,638 employees in 2006, between 2,502 and 29,830 in 
2010, and between 2,520 and 28,402 in 2014. The descriptive statistics of the samples are shown in 
Tables A.1 to A.3 in the Appendix. It must be noted that throughout all the empirical analysis the 
sample weights provided in the EES have been used. 
Results of estimating wage equations may be influenced by selection bias induced by two 
different potential factors: unobserved differences between employees and non-participants in the 
labor market and between migrants and non-migrants, and spatially related factors correlated with 
wages. In our research it is not possible to control for these types of selection bias, given that the 
dataset includes information only for employees and it does not distinguish whether they are migrants 
or not. Yet, it is plausible that the results are not greatly affected by selectivity for different reasons. 
First, because the patterns of labor participation are rather similar across Spain’s regions (e.g., in 2014 
the average participation rate in Spain was 59.5% of the total labor force, with a 0.052 coefficient of 
variation of the regional participation rates), which precludes the existence of significantly different 
regional labor participation decisions by individuals. Second, because internal migration in Spain is 
very low (Liu, 2018; International Monetary Fund, 2015; Bover & Velilla, 2005), so the evidence 
might not plausibly be significantly affected by migration. On the other hand, given that wage 
equations include controls for occupations, which may capture unobserved ability components, the 
analysis could also partially correct for possible spatial selection biases (Duranton & Monastiriotis, 
2002). 
4.2. Regional purchasing power parities 
The dependent variable in our estimations is the gross hourly wage for October—the month that 
defines the survey population—divided by the number of hours actually worked that month, and 
additionally adjusted by regional purchasing power parities (PPP). Regional PPP used in the empirical 
analysis are derived from those provided in Costa, García, López and Raymond (2015). Given the 
lack of data available at a regional level to directly calculate the corresponding PPP, these authors 












propose the use of an indirect method to calculate these PPP, in the spirit of OECD and Eurostat 
methodologies. In particular, Costa et al. (2015) estimate Spanish regional PPP on the basis of three 
different approaches: (i) to update regional PPP available for 1989viii using changes in regional 
Consumer Price Indexes provided by the National Statistics Institute; (ii) to estimate an equation that 
relates prices and GDP on the basis of the Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) hypothesis using 
OECD data at a national level, and then to use the estimated coefficients to obtain regional PPP with 
regional data; and (iii) to estimate microeconometric models for regional product prices following 
Coondoo, Majumder and Ray (2004), using household level data on income, household composition, 
and individual characteristics from the Household Budget Survey for the period 2009-2012. The results 
obtained with the three methods are consistent, being the regional PPP finally reported by Costa et al. 
(2015) a weighted average of the PPP derived from methods (ii) and (iii). A similar approach has been 
used recently in Costa, García, Raymond and Sánchez-Serra (2019) to estimate regional PPP for a 
large set of OECD countries, including Spain. 
The pattern of regional PPP estimated by Costa et al. (2015) is rather similar to alternative 
available estimations for Spanish regions based on indirect methods by Janský and Kolcunová (2017). 
In particular, these latter authors use the PPP already available at a regional level for six European 
Union countries to estimate an equation that relates prices with a full set of economic and 
demographical variables, and then use the estimated coefficients to proxy PPP for the regions 
(NUTS-2) of other European Union countries, including Spain. The resulting estimations of the PPP 
for the Spanish regions in this case are highly correlated with those of Costa et al. (2015), being very 
similar both in the ordering of the regions and in its dispersion. 
To conclude, it must be noted that as the original estimations or regional PPP of Costa et al. 
(2015) correspond to 2012, to calculate the values for 2006, 2010 and 2014, the change in the value of 
the Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) of each region between each year and 2012 has been applied 
(measured in each case from the average of all the months of the year), normalized with respect to 
the national average. 













5.1. Descriptive evidence 
Table 1 and Figure 1 contain purchasing power parities for Spanish regions. As stated before, they 
correspond to the original estimates of Costa et al. (2015) for 2012 and the subsequent calculations 
for 2006, 2010 and 2014 using regional changes in the value of the consumer price index. This 
evidence confirms that there exist very significant differences in price levels across Spanish regions. 
Hence, prices are significantly higher in certain regions (i.e. prices in Madrid are 15 percent higher 
than the national average), and significantly lower in other regions (around 15 percent and 20 percent 
under then national average in the Canary Islands or Extremadura), so that very important differences 
are found in general, with coefficients of variation around 0.10 and differences of more than 40% 
between the regions with the highest and the lowest price levels. Regional differences in price levels 
are also very persistent over time: correlations between values for different years are close to one, due 
to the presence of a very important regional homogeneity in inflation patterns.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show, in turn, the average hourly wages of the Spanish regions in the 
years examined. Wages are expressed in euros and they correspond to the raw values (left panel of 
Table 2 and upper panel of Figure 2) and to raw wages deflated by regional purchasing power parities 
(right panel of Table 2 and lower panel of Figure 2). In short, this information confirms the presence 
of very significant regional differences in raw average hourly wages, and also that its structure differs 
significantly when regional purchasing power parities are considered. Thus, without considering 
purchasing power parities regional wages range between 23 percent above the national average and 28 
percent below, they show differences between the maximum and minimum values of around 50 
percent in 2006 and 2010 and 72 percent in 2014, and they display a high dispersion according to 
different inequality measures (the coefficient of variation and the Gini index are between 0.11 and 












0.12 and 0.05 and 0.06, respectively, depending on the year). However, when regional purchasing 
power parities are considered, regional differences in wages are more reduced (although they are still 
significant), with regional average wages varying between 14 percent above and 16 percent below the 
national average, differences between the regional maximum and minimum values between 20 
percent and 31 percent, and inequality measures that are systematically halved (they are also relatively 
similar across time, with correlations between 0.67 and 0.83, depending on the years compared). It is 
also remarkable that, although there is some correspondence between regional wages depending on 
whether regional differences in prices are controlled for (Figure 3), the correspondence is relatively 
weak (the coefficients of correlation exhibit values around 0.55 in 2006 and 2014 and 0.35 in 2010 
and are statistically significant only in the first two cases, at 5 percent). For example, in the case of 
Madrid, raw non-deflated wages are around 10-15 percent higher than the national average but wages 
deflated by regional price levels are actually around the national average. Conversely, in certain 
regions such as Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León or Asturias, where raw non-deflated wages are 
comparatively low, wages corrected by differences in purchasing parity are among the highest in the 
country. Hence, this overall evidence reveals that controlling for regional price level differences alters 
significantly the regional wage structure, both in the magnitude of the differentials observed and in 
regional wage ordering. Consequently, the rest of the empirical analysis systematically accounts for 
regional wages controlling for regional purchasing power parities. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Figure 4 and Table 3 show raw regional wages deflated by regional price differences for each 
of the considered years at different points in the distribution of wages (10th percentile, median, and 
90th percentile). Initially, this evidence reveals that there exist significant regional wage differences 
across the whole wage distribution. Moreover, it shows that there exist certain differences in their 












dispersion across the distribution, with regional differences tending to be larger in the right part (as a 
matter of example, in 2014 the Gini index in the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of 
the wage distribution is 0.037, 0.033, and 0.045 and the difference between the maximum and the 
minimum wage is of 31 percent, 31 percent and 48 percent). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
The correspondence between regional wage differences observed in different parts of the 
distribution is relatively weak. Hence, although there is a certain resemblance between the structure of 
differentials in the left and central parts of the distribution (where statistically significant positive 
correlations are observed: Table 4), this similarity tends to be rather weak in the rest of the wage 
distribution, particularly as regards to the parts of the distribution that are most remote from each 
other (with non-significant correlations). In this vein, it is illustrative that many of the Spanish regions 
tend to exhibit wages higher (lower) than national averages in certain parts of the distribution and 
lower (higher) in other parts (Figure 4). Overall, these findings confirm that significant regional raw 
wage differentials exist across the wage distribution and that its structure tends to differ among 
different parts of the distribution. Hence, this evidence underlines the appropriateness of carrying out 
an analysis of the origin of the regional wage differences throughout the whole wage distribution and 
not focused exclusively on average wages. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Tables A.1 to A.3 in the Appendix include the descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables in each year (due to space constraints, the information corresponds just to the average of 
the variables). In general, although there are not significant regional differences in labor force 
characteristics such as the relative presence of women or the age structure, there are, however, 
notable differences in certain aspects, such as the relative presence of immigrants (with proportions 
of employees that, for example, in 2014 range from 2.7 percent in Galicia to 12.7 percent in the 












Balearic Islands) and of individuals with a university education (with a minimum in 2014 of 14.8 
percent in the Balearic Islands and a maximum above 40 percent in Madrid and the Basque 
Country).ix Similarly, significant differences in the characteristics of jobs and firms are observed, 
reflecting differences in the characteristics of the productive structure in each region. Thus, in regions 
such as Madrid and the Basque Country there are occupational structures with a high presence of 
highly-skilled jobs (directors and managers, technical and scientific professionals, and technicians and 
associate professionals); sectoral structures associated with high wages (like manufacturing in the case 
of the Basque Country); a greater presence of firms with their own collective agreements; and more 
qualified labor forces inside firms (in Madrid there is also a lower incidence of fixed-term jobs and a 
much greater presence of larger companies). On the contrary, in other regions such as the Balearic 
Islands or Extremadura there are high incidences of fixed-term jobs; occupational structures with 
fewer highly-skilled jobs; sectoral structures associated with low wages; firms with smaller sizes and 
without their own collective agreements; and less qualified workers inside firms. In a nutshell, this 
evidence confirms the presence of significant regional differences in the characteristics of workers, 
jobs and firms. The rest of the analysis examines to what extent regional wages differentials are 
explained by these regional differences observed in labor forces and productive structures or if, on 
the contrary, they cannot be fully explained by such differences in endowments. 
5.2. Decomposition of inter-regional average wage differences 
Figure 5 shows the results of the decomposition of regional differences in average wages in the 
period examined using the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology (full results of the decomposition can be 
found in Table A.4 in the Appendix). As indicated in the methodology section, in order to make an 
homogeneous comparison for all regions, throughout all the empirical analysis the reference in the 
comparison for each region is the whole Spanish economy. As also indicated before, the specification 
of the wage equation (1) used in the empirical analysis includes a broad set of explanatory variables, 
grouped into (i) socio-demographic characteristics of individuals that measure the attributes of the 
labor force in the region (gender, nationality, age, and education) and (ii) firm characteristics that 












proxy the characteristics of the regional economic structure (job and workplace attributes such as 
tenure, type of contract, full- or part-time, supervisory tasks, occupation, sector, size, type of 
collective agreement, and several characteristics of the workplace’s workforce comprising the 
proportion of women and immigrants in the firm, the proportions of workers with fixed-term and 
with part-time contracts, the proportion of workers in unskilled and skilled occupations, and the 
proportion of workers with primary and tertiary degrees). 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
As noted in the methodology section, the results of the decomposition are calculated taking into 
account the possible presence of errors in the estimation of both the characteristics and returns 
components via the additional use of the Di Nardo et al. (1996) reweighting procedure. As a 
consequence, the difference in the average wage of each region with respect to the national average is 
decomposed according to the four components in equations (3) and (4): the pure component of 
characteristics (that can be detailed in this case into the effect of differences in the endowments of 
individual characteristics, and of jobs and companies, respectively); the error term estimated in the 
characteristic component; the error term estimated in the returns component; and the pure returns 
component. This latter component is of particular interest, given that it captures wage differentials 
for employees with similar attributes and working in similar jobs and firms and, consequently, 
quantifies the estimated adjusted regional wage differentials net of composition effects. 
The evidence obtained using the decomposition technique (Figure 5 and table A.4 in the 
Appendix) shows, on one hand, that a significant part of regional wage deviations from the national 
average is due to composition effects captured by the pure effect of regional differences in observed 
characteristics, and that in some cases controlling for the specificities of the labor force and the 
productive structure of the region alters its relative wage, on the other. As a matter of example, the 
results of the decomposition show that the lower-than-average raw wage that exhibit the Balearic 
Islands in every year is explained by the worse characteristics of workers and firms in the region 
relative to the whole Spanish economy (plausibly due to the higher relevance of tourism in the 












region), and that once these worse endowments are taken into account employees in the region 
actually earn wages with a higher purchasing power than workers with similar characteristics and 
working in similar firms in the rest of Spain. Moreover, the results of the detailed decomposition, 
which allow to differentiate between the effect of differences in characteristics of individuals and jobs 
and firms, show that these composition effects are due very especially to regional specificities in 
terms of productive structures and only to a much lesser extent to differences in labor forces. Hence, 
for instance, in 2006 the characteristics of jobs and firms were related with wages 7 percent higher 
than the national average in Madrid and the Basque Country and between 7 percent and 8 percent 
lower in Extremadura and Asturias, while in all four cases the particularities of the regional labor 
forces had a negligible effect on the relative wages of those regions. 
On the other hand, the term that corresponds to the pure effect of the returns component, 
which captures adjusted regional wage differentials, presents in general a high explanatory power. 
Hence, this term shows that similar employees working in similar jobs and firms earn hourly wages 
that vary in practice in the range between 10 percent lower and 10 percent higher than the national 
average (in Madrid and several regions, depending on the year, respectively). Overall, this evidence 
confirms that in the Spanish labor market there exist very significant adjusted regional differences in 
average wages, net of composition effects. Moreover, it also shows that, as is apparent in Figure 5, 
these differentials ‘unexplained’ by regional differences in labor forces and economic structures are 
strongly persistent over time, with a pattern that is generally very similar for all years examined 
(correlations between the values of regional unexplained components for different years are actually 
higher than 0.9 in every case, which contrasts with comparatively lower correlations previously 
observed for average raw wages).x 
To conclude, it should be noted that the error terms estimated in the components of 
characteristics and returns tend to be very small in all cases, and therefore have a negligible effect in 
general, implying that the pure components of characteristics and returns explain almost all regional 
wage differences observed in practice. 












5.3. Decomposition of inter-regional wage differences across the wage distribution 
Figures 6 to 8 (and Tables A.4 to A.6 in the Appendix in the case of full results) present the results of 
the decomposition between the wages of each region and those of Spain at different points in the 
wage distribution (the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile). Starting with the lower part 
of the wage distribution (Figure 6), the main finding is that wage differences associated with 
composition effects are generally very small (in many case the estimated effects are negligible: upper 
panels of Tables A.5 to A.7), so that the bulk of regional wage differences observed in that part of the 
wage distribution are adjusted differentials net of composition effects captured by the pure 
component of returns (note that the estimated error term in both the components of characteristics 
and returns are again generally very small). 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
In contrast, regional wage differences observed in the central part of the distribution (Figure 7) 
are explained both by the presence of net adjusted differentials and by a significant influence of 
composition effects (as in the case of average wages, this impact is also especially associated with 
regional differences in job and firm characteristics, and not so much to differences in the 
characteristics labor forces). This same pattern is also observed in the upper part of the distribution 
(Figure 8), although in this case with a much more important influence of composition effects (due 
again mainly to regional differences existing in job and firm characteristics). For illustrative purposes, 
in 2014 the composition effect related to job and firm characteristics had average and maximum 
impacts (measured in absolute values) on regional wages of 0.080 and 0.214 log points in the 90th 
percentile of the wage distribution, of 0.044 and 0.104 log points in the median, and of just 0.013 and 
0.043 log points in the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. In the case of regional differences in 
the characteristics of the labor force these effects were in all cases significantly lower, with average 
and maximum impacts of 0.003 and 0.012 log points in the 10th percentile, 0.005 and 0.016 log points 
in the median, and 0.011 and 0.028 log points in the 90th percentile of the wage distribution. 












[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE] 
In any case, one of the main findings of this part of the analysis is that noteworthy adjusted 
regional wage differentials (captured by the pure wage structure component) exist all along the wage 
distribution. This is apparent, for instance, in the high standard deviation of unexplained components 
of regional wages in all parts of the wage distribution (Table 5). Another remarkable result is that 
these adjusted regional wage differentials exhibit a profile relatively similar both across different 
points of the wage distribution and over time. Thus, in the first case unexplained components of 
regional wages estimated in different percentiles of the wage distribution unveil very high, significant 
correlations even when comparing the most distant parts of the wage distribution (Table 6), which 
contrasts with the weaker correspondence previously observed in regional differences in raw wages 
(Table 4). Similarly, regions with higher (lower) than national unexplained components of regional 
wages in some parts of the wage distribution tend to exhibit comparatively higher (lower) magnitudes 
of those components in the rest of the distribution (Figure 9), in contrast again with the pattern 
observed in raw wages (Figure 4). In the same vein, the pattern of unexplained components of 
regional wages estimated in the same part of the wage distribution exhibits very strong similarities 
over time, very especially for those in the lower part of the wage distribution (Table 7). Overall, this 
evidence suggests that adjusted regional wage differentials net of composition effects have a relatively 
similar profile across the wage distribution and over time, which suggests the presence of common 
forces that affect the wages of all the workers in each region and that are rather stable over time. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This article examines wage differences among the Spanish regions in the period between 2006 and 
2014. Spain is a particularly interesting case of analysis for this type of differentials because previous 
evidence suggests that the country exhibits important wage differences between regions from an 
international perspective, in whose origin labor institutional elements related to the particularities of 












collective bargaining seem to play a relevant role. In the same vein, the Spanish labor market 
experienced profound cyclical and regulatory changes during the period analyzed, which permits to 
examine the extent to which differences between regions tend to persist over time even in very 
different scenarios. 
One of the main novelties of the research is that, unlike previous related studies, differences 
in regional purchasing power parities are controlled for in the estimation of inter-regional wage 
differences, on the basis of the recent estimations of regional parities Costa et al. (2015, 2019). This is 
noteworthy, as regional differences in price levels are very significant in practice in Spain (with 
differences in price levels in a range higher than 40 percent) and persistent over time, and, controlling 
for them leads to significant alterations in the structure of regional wage differentials. Consequently, 
the consideration of regional purchasing power parities proves to be particularly relevant and allows 
to provide novel evidence on the topic, complementary to that obtained in previous related studies 
where regional differences in prices were not properly considered. 
The empirical analysis is based on cross-section matched employer-employee microdata with 
a wealth of information about wage determinants related to the characteristics of employees and their 
jobs and firms. The use of this type of microdata, combined with the econometric decomposition 
techniques of Oaxaca-Blinder and Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo, allows to examine the importance in the 
generation of wage differences between regions of the composition effects associated with 
differences in the characteristics of labor forces and firms, on one hand, and of adjusted, net of 
composition effects interregional wage differentials, on the other hand. Our analysis of the origin of 
regional wage differences covers both average wages and differences observed across different parts 
of the wage distribution, in line with the most recent studies on this topic.  
The evidence obtained shows firstly that controlling for regional purchasing power parities is 
very important when estimating regional wage differences, given that in the Spanish case it reduces 
their dispersion and alters the ordering of the regions significantly. The results of the econometric 
decompositions confirm, in turn, that a part of the very significant raw regional wage differences 












observed in Spain both in average wages and across the wage distribution are explained by 
composition effects. Thanks to the use of a rich set of matched employer-employee data and detailed 
econometric decompositions, it is observed that these effects are explained very especially by regional 
differences in productive structures, and just partially by differences in labor forces. Moreover, 
composition effects are also very different across the wage distribution, being particularly weak when 
comparing lower wages and especially relevant when comparing higher wages, giving rise to patterns 
of raw regional differences which are not fully coincident along the wage distribution. In the same 
vein, the evidence obtained confirms that very significant adjusted regional differences net of 
composition effects remain after controlling for the rich set of individual and firm characteristics 
considered. In contrast with what is observed in raw wages, these unexplained differentials are rather 
similar throughout the wage distribution. Moreover, they are strongly persistent over time, which is 
striking despite the very intense changes that occurred in Spain during the period examined both in 
the economic cycle and in labor regulations regarding wage determination.  
This overall evidence that in Spain there exist significant regional wage differences net of 
composition effects, and that they are very similar throughout the wage distribution, showing a strong 
temporal persistence in very different cyclical and regulatory labor scenarios, suggests the presence of 
common mechanisms in the generation of regional wage differentials that affect the whole labor force 
and that are strongly persistent over time. Given that in Spain collective bargaining exhibits both a 
high coverage and an important time inertia in wage determination, and given also that sectoral 
agreements have an unusual regional dimension, this evidence is consistent with a role of collective 
bargaining in the generation of regional differences and, consequently, with a potential role of non-
competitive factors in the origin of wage differences between regions in Spain. This finding is actually 
in line with available international evidence suggesting that the characteristics of collective bargaining 
in each country influence significantly wage differentiation between regions (Vamvakidis, 2008). 
In this vein, considering that regional wage differences do not appear to be due to 
compensatory factors (Galego & Pereira, 2014; Simón et al., 2006) or to temporary disequilibrium 












situations, given the strong temporal persistence observed here for this type of differentials (see also 
Pereira & Galego, 2011 for Portugal), the main usual hypotheses about their origin focus on 
competitive factors related to sorting effects of workers and agglomeration economies that could 
increase productivity and wages (e.g. Combes et al., 2008 and Pereira & Galego, 2014). Although in 
the specific case of Spain a very low inter-regional mobility is expected to reduce the potential 
relevance of sorting effects, and the unequal impacts of both sorting and agglomeration effects 
observed along the wage distribution (Hakansson & Isacsson, 2018, for Sweden and Matano & 
Natichioni, 2012, 2016, for Italy) is at odds with the similarity observed in unexplained regional 
differences throughout the wage distribution in Spain, persistent wage differences among Spanish 
regions could be plausibly explained by agglomeration economies and/or sorting effects, very 
especially considering that unobserved individual heterogeneity cannot be properly controlled for due 
to the limitations of our cross-section data. Anyway, the evidence obtained for the Spanish case 
suggests, in a complementary manner, that very significant, time persistent, very similar across the 
wage distribution wage differentials for observationally similar workers could be favoured by a 
specific configuration of collective bargaining, and, hence, that institutional non-competitive elements 
might also play a role in shaping interregional wage differentials. In any case, further research is 
warranted in order to provide a deeper and better understanding of the potential link between 
institutional labor characteristics and regional wage differentials.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1. Regional purchasing power parities in Spain 
 2012 2006 2010 2014 
Spain 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
     
Andalusia 92.70 93.18 92.94 92.46 
Aragon 96.40 96.16 96.50 96.16 
Asturias 87.90 87.75 87.75 87.71 
Balearic Islands 98.90 99.50 99.17 99.39 
Canary Islands 83.10 85.33 83.92 82.29 












Cantabria 99.10 98.51 98.75 99.70 
Castilla-La Mancha  84.80 84.44 84.30 84.87 
Castilla y León 88.00 88.23 87.65 87.66 
Catalonia 108.50 107.04 107.98 109.15 
Comunitat Valenciana 93.00 93.23 93.09 92.78 
Extremadura 80.30 80.61 80.35 79.89 
Galicia 92.40 92.70 92.30 92.62 
Madrid 114.50 114.60 114.69 114.34 
Murcia 94.80 95.21 94.99 94.86 
Navarra 110.60 111.60 110.48 110.05 
Basque Country 107.70 107.37 107.94 108.21 
Rioja 90.40 90.30 90.08 90.27 
     
Coefficient of variation 0.102 0.104 0.105 0.107 
Gini Index .057 .056 .057 .058 
Minimum 80.6 80.3 80.3 79.9 
Maximum 114.6 114.7 114.5 114.3 
Maximum-Minimum (% difference) 42.18 42.69 42.74 43.11 
Notes: Original regional purchasing power parities correspond to 2012 and are drawn 
from Costa et al. (2015). In order to calculate the values corresponding to 2006, 2010 
and 2014, the change in the value of the consumer price index between each year and 












2012 (measured from the average of all the months of the year) of each region has been 
applied (normalized with respect to the national average). 
TABLE 2. Raw average hourly wages in Spanish regions 
 Not deflated with purchasing power parities 
Deflated with  
purchasing power parities 
 2006 2010 2014 2006 2010 2014 
Spain 9.36 10.62 10.95 9.36 10.62 10.95 
       
Andalusia 8.66 9.85 10.26 9.29 10.60 11.09 
Aragon 9.23 10.54 10.76 9.60 10.92 11.19 
Asturias 8.26 9.47 9.99 9.41 10.79 11.39 
Balearic Islands 8.74 10.12 9.99 8.78 10.20 10.06 
Canary Islands 7.78 9.08 9.29 9.12 10.82 11.28 
Cantabria 7.73 10.01 10.27 7.85 10.14 10.30 
Castilla-La Mancha  8.44 9.35 9.48 9.99 11.09 11.17 
Castilla y León 8.34 9.67 10.23 9.45 11.04 11.68 
Catalonia 10.14 11.49 11.70 9.48 10.65 10.72 
Comunitat Valenciana 8.61 10.06 10.28 9.23 10.81 11.08 
Extremadura 7.41 8.40 7.87 9.19 10.45 9.85 
Galicia 7.99 9.20 9.59 8.62 9.97 10.36 
Madrid 10.91 11.86 12.23 9.52 10.34 10.70 












Murcia 7.86 9.34 10.10 8.26 9.83 10.64 
Navarra 10.19 11.10 11.85 9.13 10.05 10.77 
Basque Country 11.08 12.72 13.52 10.32 11.79 12.50 
Rioja 8.02 9.30 9.83 8.88 10.32 10.89 
       
Coefficient of variation 0.129 0.112 0.125 0.065 0.047 0.058 
Gini Index .067 .058 .063 .034 .025 .031 
Minimum 7.41 8.40 7.87 7.85 9.83 9.85 
Maximum 11.08 12.72 13.52 10.32 11.79 12.50 
Maximum-Minimum (percent difference) 49.50 51.50 71.85 31.42 19.92 26.87 
Notes: Hourly wages are measured in euros. 
TABLE 3. Raw hourly wages in Spanish regions along the wage distribution 
 2006 2010 2014 
 P10 P50 P90 P10 P50 P90 P10 P50 P90 
Spain 4.87 7.53 15.95 5.60 8.64 17.78 5.86 9.02 18.27 
          
Andalusia 5.16 7.68 15.32 5.95 8.66 17.71 6.23 8.99 18.18 
Aragon 5.20 8.06 15.56 6.09 9.08 17.49 6.55 9.28 18.02 
Asturias 5.34 7.97 15.36 6.34 9.03 16.90 6.65 9.71 18.10 
Balearic Islands 5.05 7.19 14.30 5.80 8.27 16.41 6.22 8.60 15.51 












Canary Islands 4.95 7.39 15.34 6.09 8.57 18.49 6.31 9.27 18.63 
Cantabria 4.76 6.86 12.58 5.57 8.44 16.76 5.83 8.73 17.13 
Castilla-La Mancha  5.69 7.64 17.66 6.54 8.97 17.91 6.75 9.29 18.05 
Castilla y León 5.31 7.62 15.84 6.19 8.84 18.52 6.83 9.47 18.85 
Catalonia 4.70 7.68 16.34 5.42 8.64 17.81 5.65 8.95 17.92 
Comunitat Valenciana  5.23 7.55 15.12 5.95 8.71 18.14 6.30 9.11 18.16 
Extremadura 5.46 7.18 16.41 6.43 8.46 17.06 6.42 8.72 13.65 
Galicia 4.77 6.87 15.18 5.69 7.99 15.87 6.10 8.59 16.99 
Madrid 4.38 7.29 16.87 4.97 8.25 18.09 5.21 8.52 18.77 
Murcia 4.90 7.13 12.68 5.51 7.88 16.11 5.66 8.31 19.26 
Navarra 5.24 7.52 14.48 5.98 8.75 15.15 6.17 9.46 16.30 
Basque Country 5.25 8.76 17.18 6.18 10.13 18.78 6.46 10.87 20.20 
Rioja 5.62 7.73 14.09 6.53 8.90 15.06 6.61 9.43 16.51 
          
Coefficient of variation 0.067 0.062 0.092 0.071 0.059 0.067 0.070 0.066 0.088 
Gini Index .036 .032 .050 .039 .030 .037 .037 .033 .045 
Minimum 4.38 6.86 12.58 4.97 7.88 15.06 5.21 8.31 13.65 
Maximum 5.69 8.76 17.66 6.54 10.13 18.78 6.83 10.87 20.20 
Maximum-Minimum (% difference) 29,91 27,70 40,38 31,59 28,55 24,70 31,09 30,81 47,99 
Notes: Hourly wages are measured in euros controlling for regional purchasing power parities. 












TABLE 4. Correlation between raw regional wages 
along percentiles of the wage distribution 
 2006 2010 2014 
P10-P50  .441*  .554**   .597** 
P50-P90  .508**   .391  .362 
P10-P90 .175 -.043 -.117 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
TABLE 5. Standard deviation of unexplained components 
of regional wages along percentiles of the wage distribution 
 2006 2010 2014 
P10 .064 .072 .075 
P50 .057 .054 .060 
P90 .083 .064 .075 
 
TABLE 6. Correlation between unexplained components of regional wages 
along percentiles of the wage distribution 
 2006 2010 2014 
P10-P50 .769*** .904*** .869*** 
P50-P90 .489** .581** .540** 
P10-P90 .654*** .679*** .476** 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 












TABLE 7. Correlation between unexplained components of regional wages 
across time 
 P10 P50 P90 
2006-2010 0.968*** 0.888*** 0.812*** 
2010-2014 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.779*** 
2006-2014 0.938*** 0.805*** 0.643*** 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
FIGURE 1.  




















Average hourly wages of Spanish regions. Raw wages (upper panel) and raw wages deflated by 

















Regional raw average hourly wages of Spanish regions with and without 
regional purchasing power parities. 

















Inter-regional raw wage differences along the wage distribution. 
2006 (upper panel), 2010 (intermediate panel) and 2014 (lower panel) 
 
 













Decomposition of inter-regional differences in raw average wages. 


















Decomposition of inter-regional raw wage differences. First decile. 


















Decomposition of inter-regional raw wage differences. Median. 


















Decomposition of inter-regional raw wage differences. Ninth decile. 


















Unexplained components of inter-regional wage differences along the wage distribution. 
2006 (upper panel), 2010 (intermediate panel) and 2014 (lower panel) 
 
Notes: The unexplained component of regional wages corresponds to the pure wage structure effect of the 
decomposition of interregional wage as expressed in equation (5). 













TABLE A.1. Descriptive evidence (average) of explanatory variables. 2006 
 
 






León Catalonia Com.Val. Extremad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
Male .585 .631 .601 .584 .560 .590 .605 .637 .591 .550 .631 .635 .571 .546 .636 .572 .582 .625 
Immigrant .093 .054 .127 .041 .165 .092 .061 .106 .065 .112 .112 .024 .035 .115 .142 .118 .034 .135 
Age<30 .260 .295 .240 .258 .265 .256 .264 .299 .254 .249 .287 .287 .253 .243 .273 .242 .205 .258 
Age>45 .258 .205 .294 .252 .270 .239 .267 .240 .282 .285 .258 .234 .269 .255 .224 .262 .310 .259 
Age 30-45 .482 .500 .466 .489 .465 .506 .469 .461 .464 .466 .456 .479 .478 .503 .503 .497 .485 .483 
Education: 
primary .276 .301 .295 .196 .370 .352 .288 .289 .315 .241 .347 .271 .289 .221 .337 .283 .211 .517 
Education: 
secondary .439 .448 .454 .567 .448 .443 .501 .501 .403 .459 .420 .512 .436 .417 .472 .366 .380 .242 
Education: tertiary .285 .250 .251 .237 .182 .205 .211 .210 .282 .299 .233 .217 .275 .362 .190 .351 .409 .241 
Tenure 6.016 4.422 6.491 5.064 5.782 4.881 5.071 5.209 6.326 6.884 5.926 5.168 5.862 6.387 4.618 6.555 8.350 5.907 
Fixed-term 
contract .308 .431 .301 .398 .311 .343 .326 .386 .345 .218 .318 .381 .326 .259 .374 .278 .283 .264 
Part-time .168 .188 .178 .171 .134 .126 .165 .125 .172 .185 .155 .147 .141 .164 .170 .165 .170 .162 
Supervisory tasks .180 .180 .161 .169 .202 .167 .164 .160 .167 .184 .181 .136 .154 .199 .162 .172 .181 .188 
Directors and 
managers .021 .014 .019 .012 .013 .018 .017 .012 .019 .022 .017 .004 .016 .035 .008 .018 .020 .015 
Techn. and scient. 
prof. .107 .097 .078 .076 .069 .066 .062 .095 .098 .112 .083 .099 .090 .146 .076 .139 .150 .063 
Technicians and 
assoc. prof. .135 .103 .123 .102 .092 .090 .114 .078 .101 .176 .117 .068 .092 .191 .088 .083 .118 .086 
Office and admin. 
staff .135 .145 .107 .104 .156 .142 .093 .105 .122 .136 .137 .116 .132 .153 .120 .086 .112 .093 













vendors .152 .157 .164 .207 .186 .189 .203 .125 .150 .150 .134 .166 .176 .143 .138 .133 .148 .150 
Workers skilled in 
agriculture .003 .003 .002 .001 .005 .008 .004 .001 .002 .001 .002 .001 .001 .004 .003 .000 .003 .002 
Skilled in manuf. 
and constr. .180 .193 .224 .213 .186 .161 .240 .250 .214 .154 .220 .191 .207 .130 .240 .209 .184 .252 
Oper. of plant and 
machinery .102 .102 .100 .092 .063 .084 .083 .133 .110 .109 .129 .133 .122 .058 .126 .157 .138 .153 
Elementary 
occupations .165 .185 .183 .193 .231 .242 .184 .200 .185 .141 .161 .222 .164 .140 .200 .173 .127 .186 
Mining and 
quarrying .002 .002 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .006 .001 .001 .007 .008 .000 .003 .000 .002 .000 
Manufacturing .139 .095 .220 .107 .039 .035 .098 .175 .134 .193 .195 .094 .142 .074 .138 .208 .243 .270 
Prod. of electr. gas 
and water .002 .003 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .001 .002 .000 .000 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Construction .187 .233 .190 .253 .240 .225 .287 .280 .234 .128 .218 .267 .204 .138 .274 .231 .135 .261 
Trade .188 .187 .152 .203 .197 .222 .205 .142 .141 .204 .212 .195 .184 .182 .200 .142 .156 .159 
Hospitality .072 .090 .066 .094 .231 .176 .095 .053 .073 .056 .057 .074 .073 .057 .051 .074 .050 .074 
Transport and 
commun. .050 .044 .064 .041 .039 .039 .054 .039 .041 .045 .044 .045 .049 .075 .042 .035 .038 .033 
Financial 
intermediation .032 .030 .027 .006 .025 .025 .000 .035 .040 .033 .027 .025 .036 .050 .012 .002 .011 .004 
Real estate and 
rental .169 .146 .143 .175 .086 .139 .160 .114 .157 .167 .121 .134 .145 .263 .151 .140 .155 .119 
Education .045 .051 .024 .030 .036 .017 .035 .044 .042 .056 .039 .024 .024 .048 .021 .032 .079 .042 
Health .084 .090 .091 .055 .065 .090 .043 .102 .113 .085 .061 .126 .099 .072 .086 .116 .104 .013 
Other social and 
services act. .029 .029 .022 .036 .044 .028 .023 .013 .019 .031 .022 .012 .037 .037 .021 .019 .027 .026 
Size<20 .383 .431 .431 .485 .499 .384 .515 .461 .443 .355 .438 .551 .466 .243 .480 .405 .358 .517 
Size 20-49 .204 .197 .225 .247 .235 .216 .272 .242 .235 .207 .212 .217 .219 .149 .248 .297 .225 .400 












Size 50-99 .097 .093 .102 .094 .097 .117 .099 .092 .083 .100 .107 .078 .098 .088 .106 .114 .101 .070 
Size 100-199 .064 .066 .053 .035 .051 .091 .047 .045 .069 .062 .061 .028 .049 .076 .050 .076 .080 .012 
Size 200-499 .086 .060 .075 .099 .051 .071 .068 .079 .079 .101 .060 .068 .073 .122 .038 .026 .122 .000 
Size>499 .166 .153 .114 .040 .067 .121 .000 .081 .091 .176 .122 .058 .095 .322 .078 .083 .113 .000 
Coll. agr.: sectoral 
national .370 .292 .354 .361 .310 .286 .350 .370 .347 .405 .394 .240 .308 .495 .423 .226 .125 .383 
Coll. agr.: sectoral 
subnational .563 .593 .583 .632 .690 .688 .636 .620 .636 .536 .569 .752 .672 .409 .577 .756 .671 .600 
Coll. agr.: firm .067 .115 .062 .008 .000 .026 .014 .011 .017 .059 .036 .007 .021 .096 .000 .018 .204 .018 
Proportion 
unskilled in firm .165 .185 .183 .193 .231 .242 .184 .200 .185 .141 .161 .222 .164 .140 .200 .173 .127 .186 
Proportion skilled 
in firm .263 .214 .220 .190 .173 .174 .194 .186 .217 .310 .217 .172 .198 .372 .173 .240 .289 .164 
Proportion prim. 
stud. in firm .276 .301 .295 .196 .370 .352 .288 .289 .315 .241 .347 .271 .289 .221 .337 .283 .211 .517 
Proportion tert. 
stud. in firm .285 .250 .251 .237 .182 .205 .211 .210 .282 .299 .233 .217 .275 .362 .190 .351 .409 .241 
Proportion 
females in firm .414 .368 .399 .416 .440 .410 .395 .363 .409 .450 .369 .365 .429 .454 .364 .428 .418 .375 
Proportion 
immigr. in firm .093 .054 .127 .041 .165 .092 .061 .106 .065 .112 .112 .024 .035 .115 .142 .118 .034 .135 
Proportion fixed-
term in firm .308 .431 .301 .398 .311 .343 .326 .386 .345 .218 .318 .381 .326 .259 .374 .278 .283 .264 
Proportion part-
time in firm .168 .187 .178 .171 .134 .126 .165 .125 .172 .185 .155 .147 .141 .165 .170 .165 .170 .162 
 
TABLE A.2. Descriptive evidence (average) of explanatory variables. 2010 






León Catalonia Com.Val. Extremad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
Male .543 .552 .574 .601 .550 .519 .590 .590 .565 .519 .540 .609 .545 .520 .544 .615 .590 .603 












Immigrant .090 .045 .112 .053 .167 .115 .062 .090 .060 .118 .091 .025 .035 .114 .080 .094 .046 .134 
Age<30 .186 .205 .186 .198 .211 .166 .182 .217 .176 .185 .165 .203 .189 .190 .211 .194 .139 .182 
Age>45 .302 .274 .313 .290 .310 .297 .342 .281 .350 .303 .317 .310 .315 .290 .270 .298 .353 .312 
Age 30-45 .512 .521 .501 .512 .479 .537 .477 .501 .474 .512 .519 .487 .496 .520 .520 .508 .509 .507 
Education: 
primary .188 .204 .242 .167 .208 .226 .207 .245 .227 .170 .211 .202 .203 .142 .241 .218 .167 .326 
Education: 
secondary .500 .518 .461 .566 .602 .538 .517 .527 .503 .492 .509 .571 .527 .469 .512 .466 .453 .413 
Education: 
tertiary .312 .278 .298 .268 .190 .236 .277 .228 .270 .338 .281 .227 .270 .389 .247 .316 .380 .261 
Tenure 7.623 6.788 8.257 7.647 6.644 6.776 8.641 6.566 8.336 7.831 7.952 6.646 7.404 7.521 6.623 8.680 9.711 7.888 
Fixed-term 
contract .217 .309 .215 .274 .253 .244 .236 .264 .236 .167 .190 .286 .242 .179 .252 .211 .230 .169 
Part-time .208 .257 .190 .194 .327 .196 .175 .171 .218 .214 .219 .165 .172 .176 .246 .197 .187 .230 
Supervisory tasks .174 .173 .191 .171 .187 .163 .192 .166 .139 .188 .169 .153 .160 .176 .164 .187 .171 .183 
Directors and 
managers .024 .020 .021 .013 .017 .015 .014 .014 .016 .029 .021 .011 .016 .034 .010 .017 .027 .017 
Techn. and 
scient. prof. .137 .122 .113 .081 .078 .105 .094 .105 .109 .146 .133 .117 .103 .192 .118 .098 .126 .076 
Technicians and 
assoc. prof. .147 .119 .158 .134 .127 .096 .138 .113 .122 .166 .138 .121 .127 .173 .134 .157 .170 .135 
Office and 
admin. staff .123 .119 .109 .095 .140 .130 .095 .095 .101 .137 .137 .087 .102 .135 .105 .085 .104 .105 
Caterers and 
vendors .214 .266 .166 .250 .300 .290 .200 .207 .209 .196 .194 .220 .204 .209 .227 .134 .177 .174 
Workers skilled 
in agriculture .003 .003 .002 .006 .009 .002 .004 .001 .005 .004 .002 .001 .001 .004 .001 .000 .004 .002 
Skilled in manuf. 
and constr. .136 .126 .185 .222 .126 .114 .206 .189 .157 .115 .132 .202 .195 .096 .180 .212 .177 .214 
Oper. of plant .095 .094 .128 .103 .068 .073 .129 .137 .142 .089 .107 .105 .137 .054 .096 .194 .113 .156 














occupations .121 .129 .118 .098 .134 .176 .119 .138 .139 .118 .136 .137 .115 .102 .130 .103 .103 .121 
Mining and 
quarrying .001 .001 .002 .003 .000 .000 .001 .003 .005 .000 .001 .005 .003 .000 .002 .001 .001 .001 
Manufacturing .178 .127 .294 .266 .064 .062 .271 .237 .236 .193 .205 .155 .232 .094 .199 .445 .303 .387 
Prod. of electr. 
gas and water .009 .015 .004 .002 .011 .007 .003 .003 .004 .010 .014 .005 .006 .007 .008 .003 .006 .003 
Construction .098 .113 .112 .148 .125 .086 .141 .145 .126 .078 .084 .188 .137 .074 .129 .115 .088 .141 
Trade .253 .266 .231 .266 .249 .318 .222 .247 .223 .248 .275 .262 .257 .248 .320 .167 .201 .202 
Hospitality .081 .090 .057 .095 .262 .210 .097 .062 .065 .070 .082 .055 .063 .068 .063 .049 .053 .087 
Transport and 
commun. .030 .016 .019 .012 .012 .013 .009 .010 .012 .028 .017 .015 .013 .074 .010 .009 .025 .007 
Financial 
intermediation .030 .030 .022 .009 .016 .016 .007 .030 .024 .032 .030 .013 .017 .050 .007 .007 .021 .014 
Real estate and 
rental .151 .146 .116 .126 .114 .145 .097 .100 .120 .152 .125 .092 .126 .223 .097 .100 .135 .089 
Education .035 .031 .026 .011 .012 .017 .000 .008 .024 .052 .044 .016 .011 .044 .014 .012 .037 .018 
Health .097 .120 .088 .020 .096 .089 .114 .126 .132 .093 .089 .158 .100 .080 .120 .061 .098 .017 
Other social and 
services act. .037 .045 .029 .042 .039 .037 .038 .028 .029 .042 .033 .035 .037 .036 .031 .030 .031 .033 
Size<20 .418 .470 .481 .532 .568 .469 .536 .558 .498 .361 .445 .653 .512 .276 .565 .461 .403 .629 
Size 20-49 .145 .140 .157 .154 .138 .134 .142 .156 .138 .161 .154 .144 .147 .119 .145 .161 .160 .216 
Size 50-99 .087 .081 .077 .084 .063 .087 .087 .066 .067 .104 .089 .052 .081 .085 .088 .094 .093 .100 
Size 100-199 .073 .066 .051 .055 .061 .084 .044 .060 .058 .081 .072 .044 .070 .083 .063 .084 .086 .027 
Size 200-499 .094 .076 .093 .046 .069 .069 .078 .092 .106 .105 .081 .034 .092 .119 .054 .128 .101 .029 
Size>499 .183 .167 .141 .129 .101 .156 .114 .068 .133 .189 .159 .073 .098 .317 .085 .073 .157 .000 













sectoral national .271 .243 .303 .179 .204 .213 .211 .233 .245 .280 .263 .309 .230 .360 .287 .227 .145 .325 
Coll. agr.: 
sectoral 
subnational .522 .512 .469 .653 .631 .571 .502 .598 .544 .566 .551 .525 .600 .398 .570 .513 .527 .634 
Coll. agr.: firm .207 .245 .228 .168 .165 .216 .287 .169 .211 .154 .185 .166 .170 .242 .143 .260 .328 .042 
Proportion 
unskilled in firm .121 .129 .115 .097 .134 .173 .124 .137 .142 .117 .135 .139 .114 .102 .130 .100 .102 .123 
Proportion 
skilled in firm .309 .266 .291 .238 .225 .220 .251 .235 .249 .342 .295 .251 .251 .399 .263 .283 .324 .233 
Proportion prim. 
stud. in firm .189 .206 .238 .165 .209 .222 .203 .244 .224 .171 .208 .208 .205 .143 .245 .205 .168 .324 
Proportion tert. 
stud. in firm .312 .282 .294 .275 .193 .237 .279 .229 .270 .335 .284 .228 .272 .388 .247 .314 .374 .268 
Proportion 
females in firm .452 .447 .422 .417 .447 .477 .406 .407 .430 .472 .457 .390 .451 .471 .452 .389 .411 .404 
Proportion 
immigr. in firm .089 .046 .113 .054 .164 .111 .065 .091 .061 .117 .092 .028 .035 .112 .080 .092 .047 .134 
Proportion fixed-
term in firm .217 .313 .216 .272 .253 .240 .234 .264 .239 .166 .197 .288 .240 .178 .243 .207 .224 .177 
Proportion part-
time in firm .210 .257 .193 .193 .326 .195 .178 .176 .219 .216 .225 .165 .174 .175 .251 .200 .189 .231 
 
TABLE A.3. Descriptive evidence (average) of explanatory variables. 2014 






León Catalonia Com.Val. Extremad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
Male .529 .548 .561 .589 .506 .513 .523 .578 .556 .507 .531 .605 .518 .508 .561 .608 .548 .576 
Immigrant .075 .045 .076 .034 .127 .095 .036 .077 .051 .092 .075 .038 .027 .096 .090 .066 .045 .093 
Age<30 .133 .124 .139 .126 .167 .142 .138 .155 .124 .143 .119 .166 .131 .137 .154 .121 .092 .134 
Age>45 .345 .295 .370 .337 .355 .327 .366 .328 .408 .351 .366 .286 .350 .326 .336 .381 .421 .388 












Age 30-45 .522 .582 .492 .537 .478 .531 .495 .518 .468 .506 .515 .548 .520 .538 .510 .497 .486 .478 
Education: 
primary .192 .189 .202 .241 .247 .238 .204 .244 .233 .182 .220 .231 .200 .148 .245 .211 .165 .302 
Education: 
secondary .480 .519 .482 .489 .605 .561 .472 .521 .441 .482 .508 .557 .499 .429 .480 .444 .392 .447 
Education: 
tertiary .328 .292 .316 .270 .148 .200 .323 .236 .325 .337 .271 .213 .301 .423 .276 .346 .443 .251 
Tenure 8.463 7.574 9.675 8.125 6.517 7.398 8.833 7.780 9.483 8.573 8.273 6.713 8.872 8.319 8.210 1.458 11.087 9.131 
Fixed-term 
contract .202 .268 .193 .218 .203 .257 .263 .236 .228 .174 .199 .341 .193 .166 .223 .172 .196 .153 
Part-time .251 .300 .235 .262 .410 .229 .238 .251 .236 .247 .292 .265 .212 .220 .275 .205 .209 .202 
Supervisory tasks .139 .128 .136 .141 .160 .133 .125 .102 .117 .140 .140 .126 .117 .157 .136 .149 .141 .148 
Directors and 
managers .024 .021 .021 .016 .020 .022 .016 .016 .013 .026 .029 .022 .016 .032 .020 .021 .022 .030 
Techn. and 
scient. prof. .156 .147 .136 .100 .060 .083 .128 .116 .145 .162 .122 .076 .129 .215 .142 .100 .210 .085 
Technicians and 
assoc. prof. .143 .122 .149 .122 .098 .112 .116 .114 .111 .159 .125 .120 .125 .179 .113 .165 .142 .141 
Office and 
admin. staff .122 .113 .110 .096 .135 .116 .111 .097 .110 .137 .126 .100 .107 .136 .136 .076 .093 .095 
Caterers and 
vendors .222 .260 .196 .253 .322 .322 .254 .221 .199 .205 .229 .301 .235 .203 .196 .175 .167 .183 
Workers skilled 
in agriculture .003 .004 .003 .010 .009 .013 .001 .001 .005 .003 .000 .000 .005 .002 .007 .000 .001 .000 
Skilled in manuf. 
and constr. .116 .110 .140 .189 .114 .101 .167 .154 .143 .103 .117 .168 .173 .081 .134 .187 .151 .190 
Oper. of plant 
and machinery .096 .094 .167 .113 .052 .077 .118 .142 .140 .089 .126 .102 .117 .049 .121 .194 .123 .174 
Elementary 
occupations .116 .129 .079 .103 .190 .155 .089 .139 .134 .116 .125 .110 .092 .103 .132 .081 .092 .102 
Mining and 
quarrying .001 .001 .002 .003 .001 .000 .001 .002 .005 .000 .001 .005 .004 .000 .002 .000 .001 .001 












Manufacturing .172 .123 .308 .215 .061 .056 .242 .255 .240 .187 .212 .170 .215 .078 .223 .481 .298 .391 
Prod. of electr. 
gas and water .006 .014 .003 .003 .003 .010 .004 .004 .006 .010 .006 .008 .002 .001 .009 .003 .002 .004 
Construction .061 .060 .077 .101 .095 .063 .084 .089 .081 .047 .058 .118 .090 .052 .073 .069 .056 .081 
Trade .205 .232 .177 .191 .204 .242 .169 .209 .153 .202 .242 .285 .225 .190 .253 .178 .139 .188 
Hospitality .092 .090 .079 .143 .342 .228 .133 .065 .079 .078 .092 .085 .074 .073 .062 .056 .078 .072 
Transport and 
commun. .086 .067 .064 .080 .065 .087 .053 .071 .055 .083 .065 .055 .067 .148 .054 .032 .066 .052 
Financial 
intermediation .028 .031 .017 .012 .016 .013 .007 .025 .021 .027 .023 .017 .024 .049 .026 .008 .007 .010 
Real estate and 
rental .156 .154 .100 .138 .104 .131 .080 .092 .130 .163 .125 .095 .122 .235 .115 .069 .119 .094 
Education .047 .051 .037 .019 .014 .017 .017 .009 .050 .062 .034 .017 .024 .054 .026 .013 .084 .016 
Health .106 .133 .103 .039 .053 .107 .162 .145 .146 .101 .112 .103 .112 .083 .127 .058 .118 .056 
Other social and 
services act. .038 .043 .034 .054 .043 .047 .050 .035 .034 .040 .030 .042 .042 .037 .031 .032 .032 .035 
Size<20 .426 .479 .531 .662 .605 .487 .606 .551 .510 .364 .447 .809 .528 .283 .564 .478 .404 .647 
Size 20-49 .138 .137 .151 .161 .111 .119 .097 .175 .123 .149 .151 .119 .142 .120 .134 .118 .153 .182 
Size 50-99 .086 .081 .074 .096 .086 .079 .070 .059 .052 .098 .090 .024 .069 .092 .071 .099 .103 .096 
Size 100-199 .068 .051 .037 .038 .057 .083 .054 .049 .054 .084 .061 .048 .045 .078 .058 .104 .088 .044 
Size 200-499 .094 .082 .093 .043 .049 .094 .089 .099 .114 .101 .083 .000 .074 .124 .033 .122 .079 .032 
Size>499 .188 .171 .114 .000 .092 .138 .085 .067 .147 .204 .168 .000 .141 .303 .140 .078 .173 .000 
Coll. agr.: 
sectoral national .288 .275 .299 .204 .238 .177 .287 .295 .274 .290 .263 .329 .239 .394 .301 .239 .116 .389 
Coll. agr.: 
sectoral 
subnational .520 .491 .505 .728 .682 .583 .502 .548 .494 .555 .544 .593 .593 .411 .556 .499 .569 .561 












Coll. agr.: firm .193 .235 .196 .068 .080 .240 .211 .157 .231 .155 .193 .079 .169 .195 .143 .262 .314 .051 
Proportion 
unskilled in firm .114 .124 .078 .104 .179 .155 .090 .131 .130 .111 .122 .102 .092 .105 .126 .082 .092 .094 
Proportion 
skilled in firm .337 .308 .317 .246 .203 .233 .280 .259 .294 .366 .295 .267 .277 .429 .289 .299 .368 .277 
Proportion prim. 
stud. in firm .187 .186 .198 .240 .241 .229 .199 .241 .223 .178 .202 .216 .204 .145 .245 .200 .173 .283 
Proportion tert. 
stud. in firm .341 .307 .326 .277 .177 .219 .336 .249 .341 .351 .296 .257 .308 .428 .287 .358 .429 .267 
Proportion 
females in firm .464 .446 .429 .403 .489 .490 .469 .409 .447 .483 .463 .408 .476 .479 .425 .389 .451 .430 
Proportion 
immigr. in firm .073 .045 .075 .040 .117 .095 .035 .075 .053 .086 .074 .036 .030 .092 .093 .063 .049 .093 
Proportion fixed-
term in firm .201 .252 .186 .218 .202 .259 .259 .231 .237 .177 .203 .305 .194 .164 .224 .172 .201 .162 
Proportion part-
time in firm .237 .280 .217 .251 .385 .227 .229 .230 .224 .229 .273 .231 .207 .212 .256 .197 .202 .193 
 
TABLE A.4. Decomposition of raw inter-regional wage differences in average wages in Spain. 
Oaxaca-Blinder methodology 
















ad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
2006                  
Overall 





























































0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.010 -0.072 
























** (0.000)* (0.000) 
(0.000)*











 Job and 
firm 
characteris

































tics 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Wage 
































structure 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.010 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.012 0.016 0.007 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
(0.004)*




** (0.004)* (0.003) 
2010                  
Overall 








































































































 Job and 
firm 
characteris





































tics -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wage 




































structure 0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.018 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.000 -0.000 0.010 0.002 0.005 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
(0.004)*
** (0.004) (0.006) 
(0.004)*
* (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
(0.005)*
* (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
2014                  
Overall 






































































































 Job and 
firm 
characteris
tics -0.032 -0.003 -0.063 -0.097 -0.068 -0.031 -0.059 -0.010 0.006 -0.021 -0.108 -0.025 0.044 -0.036 0.021 0.072 -0.056 
















































tics 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wage 
































structure 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Notes: Hourly wages are measured in euros considering regional purchasing power parities. The estimates corresponds to a specification of the wage equation 
that includes as control variables both individual characteristics (gender, age, education and nationality) and attributes of the job and the firm (tenure, type of 
contract, full- or part-time, supervisory tasks, occupation, sector, size, type of collective agreement, type of control, type of market, the proportion of females 
and immigrants in the firm, the proportion of workers with fixed-term contracts and with part-time in the firm, the proportion of workers working in 
unskilled and skilled occupations in the firm and the proportion of workers with primary and tertiary studies in the firm). ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
TABLE A.5. Decomposition of raw inter-regional wage differences along the wage distribution in 
Spain. 2006. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo methodology 
















ad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
P 10                  
Overall 



























































tics 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 

























** (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.000) 
 Job and 
firm 
characteris
















** (0.001) (0.003) 
(0.002)*







tics 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Wage 




























structure 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.015 0.010 0.006 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
(0.002)*







P 50                  
Overall 













































































* (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)* 
(0.001)*
** (0.001) 
 Job and 
firm 
-0.025 -0.025 -0.060 -0.061 -0.051 -0.068 -0.043 -0.021 0.018 -0.025 -0.054 -0.033 0.072 0.000 -0.005 0.077 -0.069 
















































tics 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
(0.004)*
* (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Wage 






























structure 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.020 0.014 0.010 0.001 
 













P 90                  
Overall 
























































































 Job and 
firm 
characteris
tics -0.059 -0.067 -0.154 -0.134 -0.118 -0.154 -0.117 -0.046 0.041 -0.071 -0.156 -0.079 0.115 0.000 -0.042 0.054 -0.023 
 
















** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Error 
characteris
tics 0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.020 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
(0.008)*
** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Wage 






























structure 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.015 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.003 -0.042 0.021 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009)* (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) 
(0.007)*
** (0.011)* (0.005) (0.003) 
Notes: Hourly wages are measured in euros considering regional purchasing power parities. The estimates corresponds to a specification of the wage equation 
that includes as control variables both individual characteristics (gender, age, education and nationality) and attributes of the job and the firm (tenure, type of 
contract, full- or part-time, supervisory tasks, occupation, sector, size, type of collective agreement, type of control, type of market, the proportion of females 
and immigrants in the firm, the proportion of workers with fixed-term contracts and with part-time in the firm, the proportion of workers working in 
unskilled and skilled occupations in the firm and the proportion of workers with primary and tertiary studies in the firm). ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
TABLE A.6. Decomposition of raw inter-regional wage differences along the wage distribution in 
Spain. 2010. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo methodology 
















ad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
P 10                  
Overall 































































tics 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001)* 
(0.001)* (0.002)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)*
(0.001) 
(0.000)*
(0.000) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) 
(0.001)* (0.000)* (0.001)*
(0.001) 












** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
 Job and 
firm 
characteris





























tics 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Wage 
































structure 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.001)* (0.002) (0.003) 
(0.003)*
** (0.003) (0.004) 
(0.002)*
* (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
P 50                  
Overall 




























































































 Job and 
firm 
characteris
-0.023 -0.001 -0.045 -0.079 -0.062 -0.012 -0.054 -0.024 0.011 -0.010 -0.057 -0.033 0.056 -0.057 0.007 0.060 -0.078 















































tics 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.013 
 




































structure 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
(0.004)*
** (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)* (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
P 90                                   
Overall 




























































































 Job and 
firm 
characteris

















































tics -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.028 
 




























structure 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.035 0.012 0.012 0.020 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.003 -0.003 0.025 -0.001 0.005 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
(0.010)*
** (0.008) (0.010) 
(0.009)*
* (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003) 
(0.009)*
** (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) 
Notes: Hourly wages are measured in euros considering regional purchasing power parities. The estimates corresponds to a specification of the wage equation 
that includes as control variables both individual characteristics (gender, age, education and nationality) and attributes of the job and the firm (tenure, type of 
contract, full- or part-time, supervisory tasks, occupation, sector, size, type of collective agreement, type of control, type of market, the proportion of females 
and immigrants in the firm, the proportion of workers with fixed-term contracts and with part-time in the firm, the proportion of workers working in 
unskilled and skilled occupations in the firm and the proportion of workers with primary and tertiary studies in the firm). ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
TABLE A.7. Decomposition of raw inter-regional wage differences along the wage distribution in 
Spain. 2014. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo methodology 
















ad. Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra 
Basque 
C. Rioja 
P 10                  
Overall 





































































tics 0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.012 -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.001)*

































 Job and 
firm 
characteris































tics -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Wage 
































structure 0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 
 (0.001)*
* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)* (0.003) 
P 50                  
Overall 


































































































 Job and 
firm 
characteris
tics -0.033 0.002 -0.057 -0.089 -0.065 -0.029 -0.051 -0.005 0.009 -0.023 -0.104 -0.021 0.053 -0.034 0.037 0.086 -0.052 




















































** (0.003)* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
(0.005)*




































structure 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.001 
 (0.002)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)* (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)* (0.004) 
P 90                                   
Overall 
difference -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 -0.164 0.020 -0.061 -0.011 0.032 -0.019 -0.006 -0.284 -0.072 0.027 0.053 -0.114 0.101 -0.100 
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characteris





































0.003 0.002 -0.020 -0.015 -0.006 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.058 0.005 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.005 -0.031 


















* (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
(0.009)*






























structure 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.007 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012) 
Notes: Hourly wages are measured in euros considering regional purchasing power parities. The estimates corresponds to a specification of the wage equation 
that includes as control variables both individual characteristics (gender, age, education and nationality) and attributes of the job and the firm (tenure, type of 
contract, full- or part-time, supervisory tasks, occupation, sector, size, type of collective agreement, type of control, type of market, the proportion of females 
and immigrants in the firm, the proportion of workers with fixed-term contracts and with part-time in the firm, the proportion of workers working in 
unskilled and skilled occupations in the firm and the proportion of workers with primary and tertiary studies in the firm). ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
i Other studies that also apply this methodology are López-Bazo and Motellón (2012) for Spain and Kluge and Weber 
(2018) for Germany. 
ii Moreover, there could be some controversy as regards this point, given that some authors argue that there might be 
some problems in the identification of worker fixed-effects when estimating spatial wage differentials and that, as a result, 
the use of observable characteristics of workers related to human capital and socio-economic characteristics is preferable 
(Groot et al., 2014). 
iii Accordingly, we follow Oaxaca and Ramson (1994) and Neumark’s (1988) recommendation to use as the reference 
wage that which corresponds to the pool of individuals of both groups. Moreover, a dummy variable relating to the group 
belonging to each observation is included in the estimation, given that failure to include this variable could lead to bias in 
the breakdown, such as overvaluation of the characteristics component and the corresponding underestimation of the 
returns component caused by the omission of specific intercepts for each group (Elder, Goddeeris and Harris, 2010). 
iv Following Barsky et al. (2002), who suggest that these non-linearities could exist even in the case of the estimation of 
wage equations via ordinary least squares, the Di Nardo et al. (1996) reweighting procedure has also been applied in the 
empirical analysis for the decomposition of average wages with the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. 
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v In estimating the probit the same covariates than in equation (1) have been employed. 
vi To test for the statistical significance of the different elements of both the composition and wage structure effects, 
standard errors have been estimated by bootstrapping considering 100 replications. 
vii Given that in our analysis the region of reference of each individual corresponds to the region where the workplace 
where he/she works is located, it might not match in some cases with the region of residence. Yet, it must be noted that 
the incidence of commuting between adjacent regions (NUTS 2 units) is very low in the case of Spain, given that it affects 
only to 2.7% of male employees and 1.6% of female employees, being among the lowest of the whole European Union 
(Eurostat, 2016). 
viii This early estimation of regional purchasing power parities conducted in 1989 for Spain is based on the Encuesta de 
Precios Regionales (Regional Price Survey) and it has been used in previous analyses on inter-regional wage differentials in 
Spain (Simón et al., 2006; Motellón et al., 2011). Yet, it presents relevant shortcomings, given that the prices of each 
region were originally approximated from those of the capital city (more details can be found in Lorente, 1992). 
ix Specific analyses on the influence of these factors on wages in Spain can be found in Simón et al. (2008), Simón, 
Sanromá and Ramos, (2017) and Simón (2010, 2012). 
x According to additional robustness checks carried out, the use of regional purchasing does not seem to imply substantial 
changes in the results of the decomposition of regional average wage differences. Accordingly, it does not affect neither 
the pure composition effect (including its size and the relative contribution of different subgroups of covariates) nor the 
two error terms. The only significant modification induced by regional power parities occur in the wage structure 
components, whose changes seem to be completely due to this element. This evidence is available on request to authors. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
                                                                                                                                                               
